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Abstract 
This paper sets out guidelines for managing radiation exposure incidents involving patients 
in diagnostic and interventional radiology. The work is based on collation of experiences 
from representatives of international and national organizations for radiologists, medical 
physicists, radiographers, regulators, and equipment manufacturers, derived from an 
International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Meeting. More serious overexposures can 
result in skin doses high enough to produce tissue reactions, in interventional procedures 
and computed tomography, most notably from perfusion studies. A major factor involved has 
been deficiencies in training of staff in operation of equipment and optimization techniques. 
The use of checklists and time outs before procedures commence, and dose alerts when 
critical levels are reached during procedures can provide safeguards to reduce risks of these 
effects occurring. However, unintended and accidental overexposures resulting in relatively 
small additional doses can take place in any diagnostic or interventional X-ray procedure 
and it is important to learn from errors that occur, as these may lead to increased risks of 
stochastic effects. Such events may involve the wrong examinations, procedural errors, or 
equipment faults. Guidance is given on prevention, investigation and dose calculation for 
radiology exposure incidents within healthcare facilities. Responsibilities should be clearly 
set out in formal policies, and procedures should be in place to ensure that root causes are 
identified and deficiencies addressed. When an overexposure of a patient or an unintended 
exposure of a foetus occurs, the foetal, organ, skin and/or effective dose may be estimated 
from exposure data. When doses are very low, generic values for the examination may be 
sufficient, but a full assessment of doses to all exposed organs and tissues may sometimes 
be required. The use of general terminology to describe risks from stochastic effects is 
recommended rather than calculation of numerical values, as these are misleading when 
applied to individuals. 
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1. Introduction 
The need for improving   prevention of incidents and accidents in medical uses of ionizing 
radiation was highlighted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and World 
Health Organisation (WHO) in the Bonn Call-for-Action (IAEA/WHO 2012). This summarised 
the conclusions of an International Conference on Radiation Protection in Medicine: “Setting 
the Scene for the Next Decade” held in Bonn, Germany, in December 2012. The aim of the 
conference was to identify issues arising in radiation protection in medicine that needed to 
be addressed. The Bonn Call-for-Action highlighted 10 actions for the strengthening of 
medical radiation protection. Action 7 entitled “Improve prevention of medical radiation 
incidents and accidents” encourages stakeholders to “implement and support voluntary 
educational safety reporting systems for the purpose of learning from the return of 
experience of safety related events in medical uses of radiation”. Other recommendations 
were to harmonize taxonomy in relation to medical radiation incidents and accidents; to 
implement prospective risk analysis methods to enhance safety in clinical practice; and to 
prioritize independent verification of safety at critical steps in procedures using ionizing 
radiation. Although the first priority for action was therapeutic applications, the statement 
specifically mentioned interventional radiology and called for organizations to work towards 
inclusion of all modalities of medical usage of ionizing radiation in voluntary safety reporting. 
These recommendations were closely allied with Action 8 “Strengthen radiation safety 
culture in health care”. In addition, the International Basic Safety Standards (GSR Part 3) 
(BSS) set out requirements for minimizing the likelihood of unintended and accidental 
medical exposures and investigating when such exposures occur in order to learn from such 
events (IAEA 2014). 
The European Directive 3012/59 (EC 2014) defines an “unintended exposure” as a 
medical exposure that is significantly different from the exposure intended for a given 
purpose. The Directive requires the implementation of an appropriate system for record 
keeping and analysis of events involving or potentially involving accidental or unintended 
medical exposures, commensurate with the radiological risk posed by the practice. It also 
requires reporting and timely dissemination of information regarding lessons learned from 
significant events. 
Radiation-related errors in medicine can be considered as medical errors. Medical errors 
have been recognized increasingly as a contributor to patient morbidity and mortality. Errors 
in medicine are likely underreported and when they are reported the information recorded is 
often limited. However, not all errors cause harm and the health effects from the majority of 
radiation exposures that are greater than intended due to errors in X-ray imaging will be 
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negligible. The U.S. Institute of Medicine reports that 90% of medical errors result from 
systemic problems, rather than purely random events. Individuals that err are not intrinsically 
substandard performers (Kohn et al 2000). Therefore, it is helpful to understand the larger 
context of error definition and strategies to mitigate these errors through a culture of safety. 
Moreover, an exposure error implies the existence of established standards, and these may 
or may not exist across diagnostic imaging departments and other practices.  A safety 
culture requires procedures and standards that  include features such as acknowledgment of 
the high-risk nature of what is done, commitment to achieving consistently safe operations, a 
blame-free environment, encouragement of collaboration and teamwork, recognition of 
expertise, organizational commitment (from all levels), and resilience.  
Bearing in mind the context, this paper aims to bring together advice based on expertise 
and experience from professional groups to provide guidelines for implementing systems 
within healthcare facilities to assist in preventing unintended and accidental exposures in 
diagnostic and interventional radiology. It draws on methodologies that are being applied in 
other areas of safety management for accident prevention such as removal of authority 
gradients (minimization of hierarchy), use of checklists, audits, improved communication, 
and briefing/debriefing. Guidance is given on preparation of procedures for investigations 
into causes of incidents, dissemination of information on lessons learned, methodologies for 
evaluation of doses from overexposures, and approaches to conveying the level of risk from 
such exposures to staff, patients and the public. Only exposures that are greater than 
intended are considered in this paper. Although exposures less than intended can also give 
rise to clinical issues such as missed diagnoses, these may be regarded as a failure in 
optimization of radiological imaging, and are not within the scope of the present guidance. 
The paper does not discuss the reporting of exposures that are substantially greater than 
intended to external bodies, as this will be the subject of a separate paper. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Collation of data and experiences 
A meeting was held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria, from 6 to 8 March 2017 
which gave member states, and international, regional and national organizations an 
opportunity to exchange information on methods for identification and prevention of radiation 
incidents, and the investigation and reporting of unintended and accidental exposure in 
diagnostic radiology and interventional procedures when they occur. The Governments of all 
IAEA Member States and relevant international and professional societies were invited to 
nominate their representatives. The meeting was attended by 52 participants from 25 
countries - radiologists, medical physicists, radiographers or radiologic technologists, 
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regulators, and equipment manufacturers. The following organizations were represented:  
the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD), the European Federation 
of Organisations for Medical Physics (EFOMP), the European Federation of Radiographer 
Societies (EFRS), the European Society of Radiology (ESR), the Global Diagnostic Imaging, 
Healthcare IT and Radiation Therapy Trade Association, the Heads of European 
Radiological protection Competent Authorities (HERCA), the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP), the IAEA, the International Organization for Medical Physics 
(IOMP), the International Society of Radiographers and Radiological Technologists (ISRRT), 
the International Society of Radiology (ISR), the Image Gently Alliance and Image Wisely 
Campaign, the UK Society for Radiological Protection, the United Nations Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the WHO, and the WHO 
Patients for Patients Safety Network. Information and data were presented on incidents that 
had occurred and experiences shared in reporting of such events. Information included 
advice on reporting within healthcare facilities, methods for investigating to determine root 
causes, and discussion of factors that contribute to errors, as well as implementation of 
changes to avoid the recurrence of similar events in the future. Methods of good practice 
that can help to identify issues that might lead to exposures greater than intended were also 
discussed. In the latter part of the meeting, participants divided into working groups to 
discuss issues and prepare recommendations relating to different aspects of the topic. 
Information from the meeting has been collated in the form of guidance. 
2.2 Definitions 
It is important at the start to define terminology to avoid confusion. What is considered an 
accident (versus an incident), the types of errors that might lead to such events which may 
be a consequence of human factors (e.g. negligence) versus a flawed system, and 
understanding what is a detriment (remembering that the physical harm is not the only 
detriment; other detriments include psychological stress from concern about potential cancer 
risks from overexposure and public or regulatory attention to practices which may be outside 
of standard exposures). Medical errors can be defined as the failure of a planned action to 
be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (Kohn et al 2000). If 
a medical error relates to the use of radiation, it can be treated as an “event” or as an 
“incident”. The BSS defines an accident as: “Any unintended event, including operating 
errors, equipment failures and other mishaps, the consequences or potential consequences 
of which are not negligible from the point of view of protection or safety”. The BSS definition 
of an incident is similar, except that it also includes “initiating events, accident precursors 
and near misses, or unauthorized acts, malicious or non-malicious” (IAEA et al 2014). Thus 
the definition of “incident” overlaps with “accident”, but includes events, the consequences of 
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which are less severe, ones with the potential to cause harm, and events caused 
intentionally. However, there can sometimes be little distinction in routine usage of the words 
accidents and incidents. The BSS uses the more general term “event” described as “any 
occurrence unintended by the operator, including operating error, equipment failure or other 
mishap, and deliberate action on the part of others, the consequences or potential 
consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view of protection and safety”. In 
order to avoid overuse of the phrase “accidental or unintended medical exposure” which is 
the official descriptor of events with which this paper is concerned, the shorter term “incident” 
will be used in the text to encompass all accidents and events. 
Tissue reactions resulting from relatively high exposures involving poor optimization of 
radiation protection in interventional radiology or in diagnostic use of computed tomography 
(CT) or CT-guided procedures would be regarded as accidents. However, even here the 
dividing line is not clear cut, as in some circumstances the complexity of an interventional 
procedure coupled with the size of the patient, may result in skin damage, despite efforts to 
optimize the procedure (Bryk et al 2006, Suzuki et al 2008). In this case the exposure may 
be unintended, in that the operator did not set out to give an exposure of that magnitude, but 
was unavoidable if the procedure was to be completed. The risk of tissue effects in such 
cases should be taken into account in the justification and patient consent before the 
procedure commences and in the optimization during the procedure (e.g. modifying C-arm 
angulation) (ICRP 2000a, 2013a). 
Medical radiation accidents and the majority of radiation incidents involve overexposure. 
That is the delivery of a larger amount of radiation to the patient than was intended or 
required for performing a procedure. The term overexposure is not used in the BSS (IAEA et 
al 2014) or generally in legislation for individual countries, but is employed here, where the 
entire paper deals with the subject, in order to avoid repetition of the phrase “exposure 
greater than intended” that is favoured by several organisations. Overexposures that are 
clinically significant may involve a risk of tissue reactions (deterministic effects) on the skin, 
for which additional care of the patient may be required, or a quantifiable increased risk of 
stochastic effects, primarily cancer induction. Since conditions vary throughout the world, 
judgements as to whether an overexposure is clinically significant are different, as are 
requirements for reporting of incidents to the competent authority.  The majority of 
overexposures resulting from errors in diagnostic and interventional radiology will not lead to 
tissue reactions, and there is no obvious effect on the health of the individual, but there may 
be a small increase in stochastic risk. In a study of radiation incidents reported through an 
internal system over a period of ten years, for 50% of the diagnostic radiology incidents the 
effective dose received by the patient was less than 0.1 mSv, and for 74% it was less than 1 
mSv (Martin 2005). For the incidents involving doses over 1 mSv, 60% involved CT. An 
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exposure giving an effective dose of 0.1 mSv might have an associated excess lifetime risk 
of cancer incidence of 1 in 200,000 by application of the risk coefficient for a population of all 
ages (ICRP 2007a), and risks of exposures less than 0.1 mSv are described as negligible 
(Martin 2007, ICRP 2017). There is not a clear boundary above which the risk suddenly 
increases. It is difficult to argue that doses below 0.1 mSv constitute a health detriment, and 
stochastic risks from exposures of even 1 mSv are still minimal. Overexposures from which 
the risks of stochastic effects are minimal or very low still need to be followed-up, especially 
if they involve exposure of multiple patients. 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Requirements for investigation of unintended and accidental medical exposures 
3.1.1 Categories of incident 
Unintended and accidental medical exposures may occur with all types of imaging procedure 
and although health consequences are minimal in the majority of cases, proper investigation, 
and implementation of changes can avoid similar errors being made in the future (Martin 
2005). The transition to digital radiography over the last few decades, which enables grey 
scale images to be optimized for viewing independent of the exposure, means that higher 
exposures will no longer immediately give dark images as with conventional screen film 
systems. This can result in a greater risk that unnecessarily high exposures will not be 
recognised and addressed, unless the exposure index displayed on the imaging system or in 
the DICOM header is monitored (ICRP 2004, IAEA 2011). Radiography with flat panel 
detectors (DR) provides the potential for a reduction in dose, while exposures required for 
computed radiography (CR) will be similar to those for film, although adjustments are 
required to the automatic exposure control (AEC) to take account of differences in sensitivity 
with photon energy (Doyle and Martin 2006). Overexposures can result from use of incorrect 
exposure factors or inappropriate settings of the AEC and may not be detected, unless the 
X-ray equipment is tested regularly within a robust quality assurance (QA) system. 
Overexposures can also result from poor collimation, particularly in paediatric exposures 
where substantial proportions of the bodies of infants may be exposed unnecessarily, and 
this type of error can be identified in meetings to review radiographic images. In fluoroscopy 
poor positioning of the X-ray tube close to the patient together with inadequate collimation 
and choice of inappropriate exposure options can result in doses being substantially higher 
than necessary. Although incorrect settings can result in higher radiation doses, they are 
unlikely to lead to clinically significant injury such as that seen with more complex and 
relatively higher dose interventional procedures. There is an immense variety in the types of 
radiation incident that can occur in healthcare as well as in the causes of incidents. The 
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IAEA BSS requires an investigation to be carried out for the following categories of 
unintended or accidental medical exposures (IAEA 2014) (N.B. A different numbering 
system is used here, as this paper does not include therapeutic overexposures).  
1) Error in procedure: “Any diagnostic radiological procedure or image guided 
interventional procedure in which the wrong individual or the wrong tissue or organ of 
the patient is subject to exposure;” 
2) Diagnostic overexposure: “Any exposure for diagnostic purposes that is substantially 
greater than was intended;” 
3) Interventional overexposure: “Any exposure arising from an image guided 
interventional procedure that is substantially greater than was intended;” 
4) Embryo/Foetus exposure: “Any inadvertent exposure of the embryo or foetus in the 
course of performing a radiological procedure;” 
5) Equipment failure: “Any failure of medical radiological equipment, failure of software 
or system failure, or accident, error, mishap or other unusual occurrence with the 
potential for subjecting the patient to a medical exposure that is substantially different 
from what was intended.”  
Examples of incidents within categories 1-4 are given in Table 1, and for category 5 in Table 
2.  
3.1.2 Steps in the investigation process 
The following section discusses steps in the investigation process that are useful to ensure 
that appropriate actions are taken.  When an incident occurs, a record of exposure 
information and the region of the body irradiated should be made at the time, together with 
any error codes or unusual signals. The exposure data will depend on the type of equipment. 
Data that might be recorded are as follows: 
 Radiography or fluoroscopy procedures: kerma-area product (KAP), set tube voltage, 
tube current time product delivered and set, and other available information, e.g. time 
for which radiographic exposure appeared to continue if exposure termination failed 
 Interventional procedures: cumulative air kerma at the interventional reference point 
(Kr,a) (IEC 2010), KAP, fluoroscopy time, number of acquired images.  
 CT scans: volume averaged CT dose index (CTDIvol) and dose-length product (DLP) 
(required by certain regulations).  
 Mammography: displayed mean glandular dose, kV, mAs, target / filter combination, 
compressed breast thickness, and other available information.  
More recent X-ray equipment may have DICOM radiation dose structured reports that 
contain most of this information. The BSS (IAEA 2014) states that the aims of an 
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investigation of the types of incident listed in section 3.1.1 are as follows, paraphrased to 
shorten the content: 
a) Calculate or estimate the doses received and the dose distribution within the patient; 
b) Indicate the corrective actions required to prevent recurrence; 
c) Implement all the corrective actions that are under the registrant’s responsibility; 
d) Produce and keep a written record that states the cause of the incident and includes 
the information specified in (a)–(c), in addition to records required by the regulatory 
body for significant exposures;  
e) Ensure that the appropriate radiological medical practitioner informs the referring 
medical practitioner and the patient or the patient’s legal authorized representative of 
the unintended or accidental medical exposure. 
The local staff with responsibility for radiation protection should undertake an 
investigation of the incident as soon as possible and prepare a preliminary report. The 
service manager with advice from the medical physics expert can then decide whether the 
nature of the incident calls for a more detailed investigation. It may be helpful to appoint an 
individual specifically to manage any in-depth investigation, and make them responsible for 
preparing the detailed report.  
 
3.2 Procedures for investigation, follow-up and prevention of incidents 
Grouping incidents into categories can help in setting out the appropriate structure for such 
investigations in departmental procedures, it can also assist in later collation and analysis. 
The examples of incidents based on UK experiences in Table 1 are listed under categories 
proposed in the International BSS, but the types of incident that can be recognised and 
followed up effectively would need to be adapted for individual countries. The investigation 
has two purposes as far as the healthcare facility is concerned. The first is to assess the 
consequences for the patient(s) affected and provide any necessary additional healthcare. 
The second is to identify what went wrong, and implement changes to address the 
deficiencies and minimize the likelihood of a recurrence. There is a third purpose in wider 
dissemination of information about radiation incidents and radiation injuries in order to raise 
awareness, and alert others about the lessons learned from significant events (EC 2014), 
but that will be discussed in a separate paper. Within the organization, incident data should 
be secure and available to the appropriate leadership such as a general manager, as well as 
disseminated through relevant safety committees or incident review meetings.  
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3.2.1 Events resulting from errors made in the medical facility using X-rays 
3.2.1.1 Incident investigation and follow-up 
If an incident is caused by an error made by staff in the department or practice using the X-
rays (Table 1, Nos. 1a, 2, 3 and 4), the person carrying out the investigation should take all 
necessary measures to obtain detailed information, which in many cases will include face-to-
face interviews with the staff involved, to determine causes of the incidents and identify 
contributory factors. They will need to consult a medical physics expert to obtain radiation 
dose information. The investigation should be instituted with an open “no blame” approach 
and aim to identify root causes and contributory factors. Details of what occurred, why it 
happened, and any deficiencies in procedures or staff training that contributed to the incident 
should be included in the report. Follow-up should look at remedial actions, to see what 
improvements should or could be made to minimize the risk of a similar incident occurring in 
the future. On completion of the investigation, debrief of all staff involved should be carried 
out to explain causes of the incident, and describe any adjustments that have been made to 
procedures and other changes. 
There may be latent systemic factors within the department, such as too many 
distractions within the workplace or staff shortages that contribute to active errors categories 
1a, 2 and 4 also known as human errors. Examples of such latent factors are listed in Table 
2. Active factors may be due to decisions linked to poor staff alertness and awareness. The 
responsibility for addressing the deficiencies will lie with the manager or lead person for the 
service, and the requirement to ensure that any changes necessary are implemented to 
address deficiencies in procedures and training should be included in the procedures. 
However, all relevant stakeholders should collaborate in the process. There may be 
modifications to procedures, additional training of staff, introduction of additional checks, or 
other changes. There may also be adjustments to the organisation of the service, to improve 
clarity for responsibilities. 
3.2.1.2 Systems to aid in incident prevention  
Steps that should be taken following an incident have been described, but the objective is to 
avoid the occurrence of such incidents in the first place. A variety of systems can be adopted 
to help in achieving this and some examples are given in Table 3. Professional organisations 
such as Image Gently (www.imagegently.org) for children and Image wisely 
(www.imagewisely.org) for adults promote the use of tools to help in this process, such as 
checklists and audits to assist in the improvement process. In order to prevent incidents 
there should be a continuing effort to refine procedures. Before starting a procedure, it is 
useful to pause for a moment while everyone confirms that the actions highlighted in the 
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checklist have been performed or are in place. This type of “pause and check” routine has 
been promoted by professional organisations in radiology (Image Gently 2014, RCR 2017). 
The checks for paediatric fluoroscopy, for example, include: the correct patient, the 
possibility of pregnancy, justification of the examination, the anatomical site, radiation safety 
aspects, optimization of the procedure, use of AEC and grid. If these factors are written 
down on a card or poster, and the checks followed at the start of every procedure, this can 
help to avoid obvious errors.  
Incidents can sometimes result from a lack of clarity about individual responsibilities 
for carrying out particular tasks. An example of a situation where there may be some dubiety 
about responsibilities is when X-ray equipment is being maintained by a company X-ray 
engineer. Here the use of a formal equipment handover procedure, with appropriate 
checklists, can help to ensure that the responsibility for the equipment and its correct 
operation is recognised. Then if access to the room and equipment is required for an 
emergency clinical procedure, all the checks should be made to ensure the equipment is set-
up appropriately for clinical use, according to the predetermined format. Such strategies 
linked with periodic review and audit of procedures, and proper follow-up of any incidents 
that do occur, should enable robust procedures to be developed that will avoid most 
incidents.   
3.2.2 Investigation of errors made by the referrer 
An error in a procedure in which the wrong individual or the wrong tissue or organ of the 
patient is exposed may not be due to an error made in the radiology department or practice 
carrying out the exposure.  It may be because the wrong patient was referred or the wrong 
examination requested, but with an appropriate clinical history (Table 1, No. 1b). These 
errors in patient referral are often more difficult to follow-up and in some countries this may 
not even be possible, because they involve another department or organization. Where there 
is a co-ordinated National Health Service, the system might involve the lead clinician 
sending a formal communication (e, g, letter, email) to the referrer and a copy of the 
document to the consultant or practice manager under whom they were working. This should 
explain what happened and request a written statement giving an explanation of why the 
error occurred, and what action has been taken to minimize the risk of a similar incident 
occurring in the future. Whatever the arrangement, this will require a different approach from 
the internal investigation within the department or practice carrying out the X-ray procedure. 
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3.2.3 Prevention of skin injury from interventional procedures 
3.2.3.1 The link between dose levels and skin injury 
There are many reports of tissue reactions resulting from interventional procedures in 
cardiac catheterization laboratories and interventional radiology suites (Rosenthal et al 1997, 
Vañó et al 1998, ICRP 2000a, 2013a, Koenig et al 2001a, Koenig et al 2001b, Vliestra et al., 
2004, Bogeart  et al 2009, Balter et al 2010, UNSCEAR 2010, IAEA 2010, Vañó et al 2013). 
When effects occur or when dose levels are such as to give a high risk of them occurring, a 
review of procedures may be appropriate, as required for other incidents. However, doses 
are not measured and even dose estimates are unfamiliar so in many institutions and 
radiology practices staff is unaware of dose levels and whether there might be a clinically 
significant risk. When dosimetry information is not available, there is no indication of the 
potential for tissue reactions, and the link between cases of erythema and radiation 
exposure may not be recognised. Even when dose information is displayed, the quantities 
may not be familiar to or understood by the operators, so education in dosimetry and the link 
to radiation effects is important. If the threshold dose to cause injury is exceeded, the tissue 
damage will become progressively more severe with increasing dose, but the extent of a 
tissue reaction injury may not become apparent until weeks or months later. As a result any 
association between reported erythema and a radiation exposure may be harder to 
establish, particularly if the possibility is not mentioned at the time an interventional 
procedure is carried out. Moreover, staff may not believe that radiation injuries could have 
resulted from the interventional procedures carried out, if they have not previously been 
alerted to the possibility. Some cases requiring skin grafting have only been recognised 
almost a year after exposures occurred (Rehani and Srimahachota 2011, Kostova-Lefterova 
2015, IAEA 2017a). Since there is a risk of skin injury from interventional procedures, patient 
consent must be obtained and the radiation risks including clinical manifestations of radiation 
injury associated with the procedure discussed with the patient if the expected skin dose 
may be high. 
The potentially high radiation levels from interventional procedures coupled with the 
need for the operators to be close to the patient to perform the necessary manipulations 
mean that there is also a higher risk of occupational exposure. Reports of lens opacities 
among interventional staff resulting from exposure over many years highlight the importance 
of optimizing not only the radiation levels used, but also the appropriate use of protective 
methods and devices for staff (ICRP 2000a, ICRP 2012, IAEA 2017d). 
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3.2.3.2 Minimising the risk of high skin doses 
It is important to put in place procedures to prevent or at least minimize the risk of skin injury, 
through awareness of potential dose levels before and during any interventional procedure 
(Table 3).  High skin doses often result from poor technique and lack of optimization and 
sometimes occur due to equipment malfunction (Rosenthal et al 1997), but others while not 
intended are difficult to avoid because of the complexity of the procedure (Bryk et al 2006, 
Suzuki et al 2008, Vano et al 2013). Hospitals should identify procedures that have a high 
potential to cause radiation injury and ensure that the competencies for operators and the 
equipment settings used are satisfactory (ICRP 2000a).  Approaches to reducing these risks 
in different parts of the world will need to take into consideration the technology and   
resources available. There are many factors that can contribute to doses being higher than 
necessary. If the interventionalist does not have a detailed knowledge of all operation modes 
of the X-ray unit, he/she may not make full use of the patient dose optimization techniques 
available. The default settings in terms of radiation dose and image quality may not be 
appropriate for certain patients and procedures. These settings should be optimized during 
commissioning of the equipment and operators trained in use of the facilities. Involvement of 
medical physics experts during the commissioning and when the applications specialist is 
setting-up program options with the operators will assist in informing decisions on dose and 
image quality. Ensuring that sufficient training is given to interventionalists and radiographers 
in techniques to minimize skin doses for interventional procedures, such as keeping the 
image receptor close to the patient, using the lowest appropriate pulsed fluoroscopic and 
image acquisition dose rates necessary for each stage of the procedure, rotating the gantry 
slightly to vary the beam entry point, and collimating the X-ray beam as much as possible 
are crucial (Mahesh 2001, Miller et al 2002, Stecker et al 2009, ICRP 2013a; NCRP 2010, 
IAEA 2010, Hill et al 2017). The training must include the unique considerations with 
paediatric procedures as well as the impact of geometrical factors in the operation of C-arm 
equipment, such as the influence of iso-centre position, and the potential for the X-ray tube 
being much closer to the skin surface for oblique projections and so delivering higher skin 
doses, as well as ensuring the patient’s arms do not lie within the primary beam, which has 
led to injuries in the past (Vañó et al 1998, Viesta et al 2008, ICRP 2013a).  
Interventionalists must understand the impact of all the dose management features of the 
equipment and how to use those features properly. Training in techniques and radiation 
protection for cardiologists, surgeons and other clinicians using C-arm equipment, in addition 
to radiologists (ICRP 2009, 2010, 2013b), will help to avoid practices that may give radiation 
doses that have the potential to cause skin injury. Free training material on radiation 
protection in image guided interventional procedures, available on the IAEA website, 
provides comprehensive information (IAEA 2017b), together with posters on radiation 
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protection methodology in many languages (IAEA 2017c). Exposure levels in 
neuroradiology, especially interventional neuroradiology, can be a particular problem, 
because fields focussed on the head will often overlap irradiating the same area of the skull 
and these can result in hair loss (Mooney et al 2000, Imanishi et al 2005).   
3.2.3.3 Monitoring skin dose levels 
The threshold and severity of tissue reaction is linked to peak skin dose and the area of skin 
irradiated. The skin dose will depend on the complexity of the procedure as well as the size 
of the patient, so procedures where there is a potential risk of exceeding a peak skin dose of 
3 Gy should be identified. Repeated procedures with dose levels over about 1 Gy on the 
same patient within a few months will also increase the risk of injury. In all these cases there 
is a need to be aware of high doses from previous procedures and to look for strategies to 
reduce peak skin doses (ICRP 2000a).  
Software for mapping skin dose distributions from interventional procedures is 
becoming available (Johnson et al 2011, Khodadadegan et al 2013) and some modern 
interventional systems can provide real-time estimates of peak skin dose and maps of dose 
distribution calculated from exposure parameters (Bordier et al 2015). As these systems 
become more accessible they should provide operators with the possibility of monitoring 
peak skin dose throughout a procedure.  Although these options are not available on the 
majority of interventional fluoroscopy units at the present time, there are dose quantities that 
can be used as indicators such as cumulative air kerma at the interventional reference point, 
KAP, fluoroscopy time, and number of image acquisition runs/frames. The accuracy of the 
dosimetry data displayed should be validated by a medical physicist. Protocols should be 
available which take into account patient size, and contain alert and trigger levels set in 
terms of the displayed quantities. The levels should be based on recommendations of 
professional societies, and the values included in operator training (cardiologist, radiologist, 
radiographer, and other medical specialists using fluoroscopically guided procedures). 
Values that might be used, based on international guidelines are included in Table 4 
(Stecker et al 2009). The more appropriate quantity is the cumulative air kerma at the 
interventional reference point, however, it should be recognized that this is not an accurate 
measure of skin dose, as it is based on the assumptions that the skin surface is 15 cm in 
front of the iso-centre and the X-ray tube is stationary. Moreover it does not include 
backscatter which can increase skin dose by 30% to 40% or attenuation of the X-ray table. It 
may therefore be higher or lower than the peak skin dose, so ideally calibration and 
assessment by a medical physics expert is required. Older equipment may not provide 
dosimetry information and here fluoroscopy time should be used as a guide, although this is 
a poor indicator of radiation dose.  
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Radiation dose estimates should be monitored throughout a procedure for all 
patients, especially those who are considered to be at risk of skin injury, and the 
responsibility for this may be delegated to a radiographer, medical physicist or nurse. The 
interventionalist should be alerted during the procedure when the dose reaches the alert 
values (Stecker et al 2009). The clinical outcome must be the priority, even if an alert level is 
reached, so clear recommendations should be made about action to be taken. These may 
include modifying the procedure or consulting a colleague for advice. Higher trigger levels 
should be set above which the patient would be informed and followed-up, and for external 
reporting of the exposure. If any of the dose alerts are exceeded during a procedure, the 
dose information should be recorded in the patient’s medical record (JACR 2008, NCRP 
2014). The patient should also be monitored closely if any further procedures are performed 
during the next two months, and the dose from the first procedure taken into account. If the 
dosimetry parameter exceeds the trigger level for follow-up, then the patient should be 
informed of the risk. A patient information sheet should be issued on discharge 
recommending that a family member or other caregiver inspect the area of skin irradiated for 
signs of redness or rash two weeks later and including resources for the patient to contact if 
any effects are observed (Stecker et al 2009). The high skin dose should be entered into the 
patient’s medical record and the patient’s condition followed-up on their return to the hospital 
or they may be contacted after approximately three weeks to check whether they have had 
any skin reaction.  The patient’s general practitioner, referring doctor, and other 
professionals involved in the service should all be informed of the procedural exposure.  
The IAEA has established an international web-based database SAFRAD (Safety in 
Radiological Procedures) to collect radiation exposure data for procedures reaching defined 
trigger levels in interventional radiology and cardiology (IAEA 2017e). The purpose is to 
identify patients at high risk of developing tissue reactions from interventional procedures, 
encourage follow-up examinations for adverse side effects and educate healthcare 
personnel.   The IAEA request that events are reported to SAFRAD if one of the following 
levels is exceeded: fluoroscopy time > 60 min., KAP > 500 Gy cm2, cumulative air kerma at 
the interventional reference point > 5 Gy, measured peak skin dose > 3 Gy, number of series 
or cine runs > 20 or observed radiation injury. 
3.2.4 Skin injury from CT procedures 
3.2.4.1 CT procedures with a high risk of skin injury 
Events that lead to tissue reactions from CT scans are rare, but if they occur can affect 
multiple patients, as they are likely to result from use of inappropriate exposure settings 
(New York Times 2010, 2011). Procedures with higher risks of skin injury are CT fluoroscopy 
and CT perfusion (ICRP 2000b, ICRP 2007b).  Dynamic CT perfusion involves a series of 
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continuous or intermittent CT acquisitions from which functional hemodynamic parameters 
such as blood flow, blood volume, mean transit time and time to peak enhancement can be 
derived (Hoeffner et al 2004). Brain CT perfusion is used for assessment of stroke. The 
technique may be employed for the body primarily in oncology applications for lesion 
characterization and assessment of tumour response to medication and radiation treatment, 
and also in evaluating cardiac function (Sahani 2009). There is a risk of high skin doses in 
CT fluoroscopy, because scans performed during guidance of a needle, catheter or probe 
may be repeated in approximately the same location (Teeuwisse et al 2001, Tsalafoutas et 
al 2007). Examples of skin injury and hair loss from CT perfusion cases in the USA have 
been publicised (ICRP 2007b, New York Times 2010, 2011). These have involved errors 
due to use of incorrect settings by operators who did not understand the potential impact of 
CT parameter changes on dose. Examples include  selecting a “Noise Index” for controlling 
the tube current modulation mode that was too low, yielding doses many times higher than 
necessary; scanning a patient multiple times because of lack of awareness that multiple 
image reconstructions could be obtained from the same raw data (Mettler 2017); and a 
missing beam filter that was dislodged during shipping (Mahesh 2017). Lessons that have 
been learned from these accidental overexposures are to ensure that acceptance testing is 
carried out, including comparisons of performance with manufacturer specifications, as well 
as regular quality control, and to act immediately when an event occurs to assess the 
radiation dos levels; communicate the findings to everyone involved; and modify procedures 
in an attempt to avoid future incidents (Mayo-Smith et al 2014, FDA 2017). As a result of 
these incidents new regulations have been introduced in the State of California requiring 
accreditation of all CT scanners, annual evaluation by suitably qualified medical physicists, 
and recording of CT dose descriptors in patient reports for every CT examination (California 
Law SB 1237). Annual verification of the accuracy of CT dose displays is particularly 
important. 
3.2.4.2 Prevention of skin injury from CT procedures  
Methods for prevention of incidents should first identify procedures that have a high 
potential to cause injury and ensure the settings are satisfactory, but also review of all CT 
protocols including evaluation of dose especially those for more common examinations.  CT 
skin dose is not measured directly on patients, but the volume averaged CT dose index 
(CTDIvol) displayed on the scanner console provides useful information. The CTDIvol is an 
average of the dose at the surface and at the centre of a phantom. For head CT scans, the 
dose is similar throughout the phantom and so the CTDIvol is similar to the surface skin dose. 
However, for body CT scans, the CTDIvol underestimates surface skin dose and the 
relationship to compute skin dose ~ 1.3 × CTDIvol should be used (Mahesh 2017).  
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Recently, a “CT Dose Alert” standard (NEMA XR 29, 2013) has been introduced, 
which will provide an alert to CT machine operators if the scan parameters that have been 
set will give doses that exceed levels predetermined by the users. The purpose of the CT 
dose alert is to avoid excessive dose delivery due to incorrect settings or repeat scans.  The 
US Food and Drug Administration has suggested a CT alert value for CTDIvol of 1 Gy, which 
should allow the user to adjust the scan settings to avoid any potential skin injuries (FDA 
2009, 2010). In addition, the user also has the option to set “CT Dose Notification” levels 
(AAPM 2011) for CTDIvol and DLP that can be chosen for each scan series and when these 
levels would be exceeded, programs will alert the operator prior to the examination. If the 
operator wishes to continue with the parameters that have been set, then reasons have to 
be documented. The CT Dose Notification option can be a useful tool for quality 
management and users can monitor their respective CT practice by routinely auditing the CT 
dose reports (Mahesh 2016). 
3.2.5 Investigation of events resulting from equipment faults 
When some aspect of the X-ray imaging equipment fails, this can give rise to an 
overexposure either because more radiation is delivered than is appropriate or a patient is 
exposed without any usable images being generated, and some examples are given at the 
end of Table 2. If there is an unintended overexposure due to an equipment fault, the unit 
should be taken out of clinical service until the fault has been addressed. The investigation 
will require the supplier of the equipment to be notified and arrangements made for an 
investigation into the circumstances and causes of the incident. This will require input from 
the equipment manufacturer’s representative and the hospital medical physics expert, as 
well as the imaging staff involved.  Technical reports should be obtained from the equipment 
suppliers and any further actions considered necessary taken to minimize the risk of a 
similar incident occurring in the future. There should be procedures in place to ensure that 
any necessary tests are carried out to verify that equipment performance is satisfactory, 
before the equipment is returned to service. For this type of incident it will in some 
circumstances be appropriate to submit a report to the National Incident Reporting and 
Investigation Centre to allow dissemination of relevant information to other users.  
Systems that can aid in reducing risks of an incident resulting from an equipment 
fault are listed in Table 3. Equipment faults are more likely to occur in equipment that is older 
or has not been maintained properly. Equipment that is between six and ten years old and 
maintained should still be suitable for practice, although this will depend on the workload for 
which it is being used. However, radiology departments and practices should develop 
strategies for replacement of equipment at appropriate intervals to minimize risks and 
replace equipment that is over ten years old (COCIR 2013). Keeping equipment fault logs is 
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helpful for informing decisions on equipment replacement. Facilities should have 
comprehensive QA programmes to assess equipment performance, including evaluation of 
image quality, and retake analysis (IAEA 2007, 2014). This should include comprehensive 
tests by a medical physics expert, which may be performed annually depending on the type 
of equipment, and more regular constancy checks by radiographers to ensure any change in 
performance is identified at an early stage. QA programmes should involve the active 
participation of medical physicists, radiographers, and radiologists. There should also be 
regular surveys to ensure that patient doses are at acceptable levels (Martin 2008).  
3.3 Assessment of doses to patients from overexposure and risks of stochastic 
effects 
Reporting of radiation doses following unintended and accidental exposures may be based 
on organ, skin or effective doses. Organ dose estimations should be used when exposure is 
predominantly of one organ, but the effective dose for a reference person provides an 
assessment that can be used when several organs are irradiated and provides a valuable 
method for giving an indication of detriment for small exposures. The limitations of effective 
dose, especially when only a limited portion of the body is irradiated, should be borne in 
mind. Effective dose is a general dose quantity derived from risks averaged over a whole 
population, and relative risks linked to effective dose, as well as varying with sex for some 
organs, are known to be substantially higher for adolescents and lower for older groups. The 
majority of overexposures from incidents will be low, so methods for dose estimation should 
be fairly simple. If the dose is less than a few mSv, and the additional dose from the 
overexposure is similar to that of the procedure, as is frequently the case (Martin 2005), then 
generic values from published data can be used. At low radiation levels the effective dose 
can be derived from exposure data (e.g. DLP coefficients to derive effective dose in CT, or 
KAP values for interventional) and coefficients that might be used for this purpose are given 
in Table 5.  When the excess effective dose is much greater than 10 mSv a full evaluation 
using doses for individual radiosensitive organs and tissues may be appropriate. 
Local/regional agreement will be required on the level at which determination of organ doses 
is necessary. General terminology can be used to describe risks of cancer incidence, linked 
to the dose level. Recommended risk terms that are appropriate for use in explanations to 
service providers, patients, the public, and administrators when effective doses lie within 
different ranges are given in Table 6 (Martin 2007). Quantitative risks derived from organ 
doses using age and sex related coefficients provided by international organizations (e.g. 
BEIR VII 2006, ICRP 2007, HPA 2011) might be used where an in-depth assessment of risk 
is required performed by a medical physics expert with a knowledge of radiation effects. 
Page 18 of 32AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - JRP-101017.R1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
pt
d M
nu
cri
pt
19 
 
However it must be borne in mind that there are large uncertainties when applying these 
risks to individuals, even when the sex and age related values of risk are used. 
3.4 Communicating radiation risk to patients 
Procedures about informing patients of any unintended exposures and related risks will vary, 
and individual decisions will depend on the staff, patients, and caregivers involved. The 
operator with responsibility for making the exposure could inform the patient of any 
unintended exposure at the time of the examination, if he/she judged that was appropriate, 
or alternatively, the responsible radiologist or other imaging professional might do so before 
the patient left the department. An indication of risk should be given in general terms (Table 
6), together with information on the effective dose, and how this compares with doses from 
other sources such as natural background radiation can be included. Considerable care 
should be taken in the explanation, since the perception of radiation risk among the public at 
large is poor and the stress resulting from knowledge that a patient has received an 
unintended exposure may be more harmful than the exposure itself.  If the patient is not 
informed of the unintended exposure during his/her visit to the department, then the 
radiologist should provide information about the exposure to the referring clinician, to allow 
him/her to inform the patient and explain the level of risk. A record should be made to 
confirm whether the patient was informed about the incident.   
3.5 Unintended exposures of the embryo/foetus 
3.5.1 Exposure of pregnant females  
An unintended exposure of an embryo or foetus may occur because a female is unaware 
that there is a possibility that she might be pregnant. Departments should minimize the risk 
through making checks on the reproductive status of female patients of child-bearing age 
(Table 3), which might include the date of their last menstrual period, immediately prior to the 
examination. Departments should establish procedures for dealing with pregnant patients 
that set out clearly when checks should be made for different examinations and the actions 
appropriate for dealing with possible responses from the patient. Other steps such as putting 
up notices in patient waiting areas requesting anyone who is pregnant to inform a staff 
member provide an avenue through which patients are alerted of the need for pregnancy to 
be considered prior to the examination being undertaken. However, if there is a failure in the 
verbal or written pregnancy screening procedure, and a pregnant female is exposed 
unintentionally, an internal investigation should be undertaken and an assessment made of 
the foetal dose. If a female is known to be pregnant, but a decision is made to justify the 
examination, based on a clinical decision, then the exposure is intended, but special 
attention must be given to dose optimization taking into consideration both the pregnant 
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female and the unborn child. If the uterine dose is over a few mGy there may still be a need 
to make an assessment of the dose to be recorded in the patient’s record.  
If the exposure occurs during the first two weeks of pregnancy, then the embryo will 
probably either be aborted or it will recover completely. From the 3rd to the 8th week post 
conception, the possible forms of damage are organ malformation or mental retardation, but 
these effects only occur at dose levels over 100 mGy, which is much higher than doses 
expected from diagnostic imaging (ICRP 2000c). Some radiological examinations involving 
the abdomen or pelvis are capable of delivering radiation doses of tens of mGy to the unborn 
child, but situations that may lead to radiation doses of 100 mGy are unlikely   to occur from 
diagnostic exposures.  Therefore, medical abortion due to a diagnostic X-ray examination 
should almost never be justified.  However, at dose levels from diagnostic radiology there is 
a small increased risk of childhood cancer from foetal exposure, and although the risk in 
almost all cases will be <0.1%, an estimation of embryo/foetal dose is often needed.  
3.5.2 Assessment of foetal dose 
When the uterus is remote from the anatomical area that is exposed to the primary beam, 
the dose to the embryo/foetus from scattered radiation is usually very small, and any risk is 
minimal or negligible (Table 6). Therefore, estimates of the foetal dose will be needed only if 
the foetus is in or near the primary beam. Various studies using Monte Carlo simulation have 
been undertaken to provide coefficients that link foetal dose to measurable dose quantities. 
These show that during the first trimester, the dose depends on the depth of the embryo, 
which can vary from 4 to 10 cm. The depth is affected by the status of the bladder and the 
mother’s body mass index. For radiographic examinations coefficients giving the 
embryo/foetal dose normalised with respect to the incident air kerma (Ka,i) for the first, 
second, and third trimesters of gestation as a function of kVp, and depth for the embryo 
during the first trimester, are available for different projections (Damilakis et al 2002). A 
selection of factors giving foetal dose as a fraction of air kerma incident on the skin surface 
of the mother for radiographic examinations of the abdomen are given in Table 7. The ratios 
were calculated using on-line software CODE (COnceptus Dose Estimation), a free tool 
developed by the University of Crete (2015) that allows calculation of embryo/foetal doses 
and risks from a wide range of exposure parameters for X-ray examinations performed on 
expectant mothers. 
Patient-specific Monte Carlo simulations have been used to derive estimates of 
embryo/foetal radiation doses from abdominal CT examinations, which are the procedures 
more likely to lead to doses of tens of mGy. Angel et al 2008 have estimated embryo/foetal 
doses from typical abdominal and pelvic CT examinations for a range of gestational ages (5 
to 36 weeks). While Damilakis et al 2010a have developed a method for the accurate 
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determination of embryo/foetal dose from abdominal/pelvic multi-detector CT (MDCT) 
examinations performed on pregnant females during the first seven weeks post conception. 
These methods provide dose data for typical protocols with a fixed scan length. However, 
modified low-dose imaging protocols are frequently used in CT and a procedure has been 
developed for the estimation of embryo/foetal dose from any MDCT examination of the trunk 
performed during all stages of gestation using dosimetry data from the CT scanner and 
either the depth of the embryo for the first trimester or the abdominal circumference of the 
mother for foetal exposures (Damilakis et al 2010b). The CODE software tool (University of 
Crete 2015) has facilities for calculation of embryo/foetal doses from radiography, 
fluoroscopy, and CT examinations, from exposure and dosimetry data. The embryo/foetus is 
more sensitive to radiation exposure than an adult, and recommended terminology for 
describing risk linked to dose level should be modified accordingly (Table 6). 
4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to provide advice on strategies for identification and prevention of 
unintended and accidental overexposures. Guidance is given on methods for investigating 
and reporting diagnostic radiology incidents within healthcare facilities, and implementing 
changes to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents occurring in the future. Particular 
attention is given to interventional and CT exposures that could result in skin doses high 
enough to produce tissue reactions. Some of the more important actions required for 
preventing incidents are summarised in Table 3.  The main factor in reducing risks of tissue 
reactions is ensuring that staff operating interventional equipment or CT scanners has been 
given in-depth training in use of the equipment and all the facilities through which doses can 
be reduced. The use of checks on dose parameters before commencing procedures and 
setting of dose alert values provide additional safeguards. Such effects cannot always be 
avoided in interventional procedures, even when techniques are optimized, but if proper 
procedures are followed, the risks can be kept to a minimum. 
The effects of unintended and accidental medical exposures in other types of 
imaging procedure are less obvious, but nevertheless result in some health detriment in 
terms of small increases in the risks of cancer. It is important to learn from any errors that 
occur, so proper investigation procedures should be in place and staff educated in their use. 
Responsibilities for investigation and reporting should be clearly set out in written policies 
and procedures in order to ensure that any changes or additional training required are 
carried out. Systems that can assist in improving arrangements within radiology departments 
and things that should be in place to help reduce the likelihood of equipment faults are listed 
in Table 3. If health facilities review and audit their procedures and consider whether they 
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might adapt and develop robust systems along the lines suggested, then this should go 
some way to helping to prevent as many exposure incidents as possible, although it will 
never be possible to eliminate errors entirely.  
When an overexposure of a patient occurs, there is a requirement for an evaluation 
of the dose in order to gain some assessment of the potential risk. When the doses are less 
than a few mSv, an approximate value for either the organ irradiated or the effective dose, if 
a number of organs are involved, is likely to be sufficient. This can be based on exposure 
data, but if the dose is very small a generic value for the examination may be sufficient. For 
assessment of foetal doses there are various methods described in referenced publications, 
and software available via the internet that might be used. The use of terminology that gives 
an approximate indication of the risk of any stochastic effects for adults, children or foetuses 
from any exposures is recommended. However, if the exposure represents tens of mSv 
effective dose, then an in-depth assessment involving estimation of doses for individual 
organs and tissues may be appropriate, and then age and sex related coefficients can be 
used to derive an estimate of stochastic risk, but it should be remembered that even these 
risk calculations have large uncertainties. 
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Table 1 Examples of incidents of different types resulting from human errors  
 
1) Error in procedure 
a) Radiology error in procedure 
Wrong patient identified for procedure  
Wrong limb or wrong side of the body examined 
Wrong examination performed 
b) Error in referral 
Request for wrong patient  
Inappropriate examination requested and performed 
Exposure of wrong body part or wrong side of the body requested 
Repeat exposures from duplicate requests 
 
2) Diagnostic overexposure 
AEC chamber not aligned with X-ray tube  
Digital radiography data deleted in error prior to review of images 
CT scanner position reset and wrong part of patient scanned  
CT scan performed without contrast medium when contrast was required 
3) Interventional overexposure 
Threshold for tissue reactions on the skin exceeded because of poor 
optimization of the procedure 
4) Unintended foetal exposure 
Failure to identify pregnant female or unknown early pregnancy 
Error in equipment set-up resulting in CT scan of pelvis instead of chest of 
pregnant patient 
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Table 2 Latent (systemic) factors that might contribute to incidents and  
examples of equipment faults 
Procedural failures 
Lack of adequate training of staff or instructions 
Lack of knowledge of equipment being used and its features and options 
Poor or inadequate standard operating procedures (mandatory in European 
union since 1997 (EC1997)) 
Lack of knowledge about optimization of protection for patient 
Insufficient supervision of inexperienced staff 
Flaws in examination protocols or lack of protocols 
Lack of clarity in responsibilities (e.g. No formal handover of responsibility for 
equipment safety from radiology personnel to X-ray engineer during 
maintenance, see section 3.2.1.2) 
Gaps or ambiguities in functions and lines of authority 
Staff shortage or high staff turnover  and pressure of work 
Lack of operating documents in a language understandable to users 
Lack of attention to dose display or display not visible to the operator during 
interventional procedures 
Lack of dose alerts when selected factors seem inappropriate 
Ignoring error messages 
Misunderstanding of displays or software messages 
Inconsistent use of different dose quantities and units 
Inadequate quality control of equipment  
Inadequate programme for acceptance and commissioning of equipment 
 Doses and dose rates for interventional equipment set too high 
 Inappropriate settings for AEC  
Lack of an equipment maintenance programme 
Poor reliability due to age of equipment 
Equipment faults 
Malfunction of AEC in radiographic unit 
Failure of X-ray exposure timer 
Digital image data lost before examination reported  
CT scanner failed part way through examination 
Software upgrade error affecting protocol and image processing settings 
Internal parameters set incorrectly following equipment maintenance 
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Table 3 Actions helping to prevent unintended and accidental exposures 
Systems for preventing procedural errors and diagnostic overexposures 
Pause and check of critical items on list before commencing procedure (often called “time 
out”) 
Agreed procedures for investigation and reporting of incidents, and defined responsibilities 
for taking action to address deficiencies that have contributed to incidents 
Regular meetings to review incidents, determine causes, share experiences, decide upon 
changes to be implemented, and disseminate information.    
Periodic audit and review of procedures and protocols 
Use of equipment handover form for engineers servicing X-ray equipment  
Procedures for reducing risks of deterministic effects from image-guided 
interventional and CT procedures 
Ensuring that all staff are aware of the dose metrics, dose monitoring, and potential doses 
delivered by the X-ray equipment and the levels at which tissue reactions might occur and 
training on this is refreshed periodically . 
Ensuring all staff are trained in use of X-ray equipment they operate, especially techniques 
for minimizing skin dose and dose saving technology on interventional equipment. 
Optimization of programme options available on the X-ray equipment during 
commissioning.   
Reviewing patient information including estimation of radiation exposure from recent 
previous procedures to determine potential risk of skin damage prior to commencement of 
interventional procedures. 
Monitoring dose parameters during interventional procedures and alerting the operator at 
agreed level when there could be a risk of skin damage. 
Use of dose check on CT scanners to confirm CTDIvol equates to a skin dose below 1 Gy. 
Periodic review of interventional and CT scan protocols and correction of inconsistencies. 
Systems to minimize equipment faults and their effects 
Comprehensive acceptance testing carried out once equipment has been installed  
Effective QA programmes (involving radiographers and medical physicists)   
Adequate maintenance of radiological and associated equipment 
Equipment replacement programme in place 
Engagement between manufacturers and users – e.g. add/make effective fail-safe systems 
and warning messages 
Recording equipment related issues in fault logbook 
Use of logbook to record software and protocol changes, with system for checking dose 
performance after any software upgrades or reloads  
Systems for preventing unintended foetal exposures 
Notices in waiting area asking female patients to inform staff if they are or could be 
pregnant 
Agreed procedure for screening female patients to identify individuals who might be 
pregnant 
Confirming date of last menstrual period prior to examination of females of child-bearing 
age. 
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Table 4 Trigger levels for action relating to high skin doses in interventional 
procedures (Stecker et al 2009) 
Dose parameter ICRU 
symbol 
Alert during 
procedure 
Increment 
between alerts 
Trigger level 
for potential 
follow-up 
Peak skin dose  2 Gy 0.5 Gy 3 Gy 
Cumulative air kerma at the 
intervantional reference pt. 
Ka,r 3 Gy 1 Gy 5 Gy 
Kerma area product PK,A 300 Gy cm2 100 Gy cm2 500 Gy cm2 
Fluoroscopy time  30 min 15 min 60 min 
 
Table 5 Values of coefficients giving effective dose (E) per unit exposure; KAP for 
radiography and fluoroscopy (Wall et al 2011) and DLP for CT (Shrimpton et al 2016). 
Radiology examination E per KAP 
(mSv / Gy cm2) 
CT examination E per DLP 
(mSv / mGy cm) 
Head AP/PA 0.058/0.034 Head (acute stroke) 0.0020 
Head lateral 0.037 Cervical spine 0.0057 
Cervical spine AP 0.19 Chest 0.027 
Cervical spine lateral 0.12 CTA (abdominal aorta) 0.014 
Chest PA 0.16 CTPA (pulmonary embolism)  0.027 
Chest lateral 0.13 Abdomen 0.024 
Thoracic spine AP 0.24 Abdomen and pelvis 0.020 
Thoracic spine lateral 0.091 Virtual colonoscopy 0.020 
Lumbar spine AP 0.22 Enteroclysis -Crohn’s disease 0.020 
Lumbar spine lateral 0.092 Kidney-ureter-bladder 0.018 
Abdomen 0.18 Urogram 0.018 
Pelvis 0.14 Chest abdomen pelvis 0.021 
Coronary Angiography 0.16 Whole body 0.0093 
PA – postero-anterior, AP – anteroposterior, CTA - CT angiography, CTPA - CT pulmonary 
angiography 
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Table 6 Terms used for describing health detriment from radiological exposures 
Effective 
doses (mSv) 
Term to describe 
risk to patients 
Examples of radiological procedures within  different 
dose categories 
< 0.1 Negligible Radiographs of chest, shoulder, limbs, and teeth. 
0.1–1 Minimal Radiographs of spine, abdomen, pelvis and head.  
1–10 Very low CT scans of the head, barium meals and enemas, 
cardiac angiography, interventional radiology. 
10–100* Low CT scans of chest, abdomen and / or pelvis, PET-
CT, interventional radiology and cardiology. 
>100  Moderate (at the 
minimum) 
Multiple interventional or CT procedures 
Foetal dose 
(mGy) 
Term to describe 
risk to foetus 
Examples of radiological procedures performed on 
pregnant female within  different dose categories 
<0.01 Negligible Radiographs of chest, limbs, neck, thoracic spine, 
teeth, and mammography. 
0.01-0.1 Minimal Pulmonary angiogram. 
0.1–1 Very low Radiographs of abdomen, pelvis, hip; Barium meals; 
CT pelvimetry, CT chest. 
1–10 Low Radiograph of lumbar spine; barium enema; CT 
scans of lumbar spine or abdomen. 
10–100 Moderate CT scans of abdomen and/or pelvis 
*Note that routine CT body scans in adults rarely exceed the 20 mSv range 
 
Table 7 Ratios of embryo or foetal dose over air kerma incident on the skin from 
radiographic examinations of the abdomen for an X-ray unit with 3 mm Al filtration 
(mGy/mGy).  
Factors were derived using CODE (Damilakis et al 2002, University of Crete 2015)  
   1st trimester  2nd trimester 3rd trimester 
Embryo depth 6 cm 8 cm 10 cm   
kVp Projection      
70 AP 0.53 0.36 0.24 0.35 0.33 
80 AP 0.61 0.42 0.30 0.42 0.39 
80 PA 0.20 0.29 0.42 0.28 0.27 
90 AP 0.68 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.45 
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